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Contrary to the period 1992 to 1995, when the European Union did not manage to
react either multilaterally or unilaterally in BiH, and afterwards when the EU, whilst
trying to solve the crisis abandoned the European ideal of individual rights and chose
the way of real politics, collective rights and the respect for the relation of the powers
in the region. Today sproposals and initiatives go clearly in the direction for the
integration of BiH into the EU and the strengthening of the state institutions. Current
European diplomacy shares a common position regarding BiH. Starting with 1996, the
EU help is constantly increasing, from the PHARE and Obnova to the CARDS and
some new and more complex and effective programs. After 1999, and especially after
the Thessaloniki Summit it is clear that the Council of Ministers of the EU is support-
ing the European future of BiH. The process of association of BiH into the EU has
started and cannot be stopped.
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The relations of BiH and the Euro-
pean Union prior to the signing of
the Dayton Peace Agreement
The crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina took
place in an inconvenient time. It was too early for
the European Union to react. Brussels was absent
from the area of foreign and security politics. The
co-operation between the member states of the EU
functioned on the basis of the European political co-
operation during that time, which was established in
1970 and partly developed in 1986 and 1987 by the
Single European Act.' The mentioned mechanism
envisioned regular meetings between Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and the establishment of a common
work direction. All decisions were unanimous. Brus-
sels was also caught in a discrepancy. During the
. Associate Partner, Centre for Security Studies,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
time of the crisis eruption in BiH, the European Eco-
nomic Union reformed itself into the European Un-
ion, which was officially established with the ratifi-
cation of the agreement signed in Maastricht at the
beginning of the 1990s. Only at the end of the 1990s,
after the ratification of the Copenhagen Agreement,
the joint foreign and security policy became more
operative. This was demonstrated with the Kosovo
and Macedonia examples. Carl Bildt noticed that the
United States must harmonise "institutional atti-
tudes", while Europe must co-ordinate "national at-
titudes","
During the crisis in BiH, European officials,
Government and State Presidents did not have the
political will and the courage to multilaterally or
unilaterally undertake serious preventive measures.
Regardless of some of the joint European peace ini-
tiatives, during that time no two-member states
shared similar opinions, not to mention a joint policy
towards BiH. The member states performed as an
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out of tune orchestra. The European steering engine,
France and Germany, due to the unification of the
latter one, were inactive. This was the time of politi-
cal realism and the great weakness of the Union.
Haris Silajdzic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time,
emphasises that the fall of the Berlin Wall was cel-
ebrated for too long. "In that intoxication, Europe
allowed itself the attitude it had towards the aggres-
sion and genocide in BiH. There is no doubt that the
war in Bosnia represented the lowest level the Euro-
pean Union sank to during the second half of the last
century.'? "Europe betrayed us, Americans helped
us" stated Dr. Mustafa Ceric, Reisul-u-lema of the
Islamic community in BiH. "It is not debatable that
at the beginning of the war we made incorrect steps
and that we could not guarantee the safety of the
country at the time.:" said Jorgen Kosmo, President
of the Norwegian Parliament. The absence of Eu-
rope during the first half of the 1990s has not been
forgotten. The official Brussels also admitted its lack
of judgement and non-engagement during that pe-
riod. Whilst addressing the participants of the Inter-
national Forum on the Prevention of Genocide in
Stockholm in January 2004, Xavier Solana, the High
Representative of the EU, confirmed the mistakes of
the EU. "We also made mistakes,"! he said, looking
back at the poor judgement that genocide could ever
be committed in Srebrenica and Rwanda. "Not be-
ing able to foresee and to react means to allow cata-
strophic consequences." The absence of Europe did
not make a good impression on the Americans. Ri-
chard Holbrooke believes that Bosnia and
Herzegovina defined "the first phase of the relations
between Europe and the United States after the Cold
War, showing Bosnia as being dangerous for rela-
tions in the Atlantic Alliance." Finally, the Dayton
Agreement put the European Union to shame. In or-
der for the world not to see that, France insisted that
the peace agreement should be signed in Paris.
The condition for the recognition pf Bosnia
and Herzegovina by the member states of the EU,
was to hold a referendum to see whether the citizens
of Bosnia and Herzegovina were in favour of a sov-
ereign and independent state. That is how Brussels,
in the case of BiH, asked for an additional point of
support and argumentation for its decision. Also, it
was buying time, since there were different opinions
on whether to accept BiH prior or following the in-
ternal agreement by the three peoples of BiH. On
the day of the publication of the results of the refer-
endum, the daily Oslobodenje, appeared with the ti-
tle "A Convincing Answer for Europe" on the cover
page. Out of the 64.5% of citizens who voted at the
referendum in March 1992, 99.5% were in favour of
a sovereign and independent Bosnia and
Herzegovina. After this the European Union recog-
nized Bosnia's independence on 6 April, in the same
year. Full diplomatic relations were established in
March 1993. After the international acceptance, the
European Union left Bosnia and Herzegovina at the
mercy of the nationalistic ideologies and ambitions
for greater states.
Since the international recognition of BiH,
Brussels and other European capitals came a long
way in growing up and maturing. At the very begin-
ning of and during the aggression' the EU did not
offer any political support to the independent BiH.
On the contrary, the suggested propositions caused
the division of the state, according to ethnic lines.
The initiatives by the European mediators, Lord
Carrington, Lord David Owen, as well as peace pro-
posals Cuthileiro 1992, Vance-Owen 1993, Owen-
Stoltenberg 1994, and so on, came one after the other.
The common trait shared by all of them was the re-
spect for the reality in the field and distorted state
constitution. The European ideal of individual rights
was replaced by real politics, collective rights and
respect of the power relations within the region where
Croatia, and especially Serbia, were treated as
stronger partners the future of a third country can be
agreed with. The greatest misfortune of such rela-
tions was not the contents of all European initiatives,
but the wrong signal that one could conquer territo-
ries by armed conflict and cleanse them of the mem-
bers of other ethnic groups, and go unpunished.
Tadeusz Mazowietzki, special UN appointee for hu-
man rights in the former Yugoslavia, pointed out in
his report of November 1992, that Vance-Owen's
plan stimulated ethnic cleansing.'
Contrary to the 1992 to 1995 period, current
suggestions and initiatives have established the in-
tegration of BiH, strengthening the central institu-
tions for the benefit of all its citizens. Today Euro-
pean diplomacy is unified on the issue of the West-
ern Balkan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However,
this has not happened over night or at one summit, it
was a gradual process of taking the control over the
region from the United States of America.
Relations between BiH and the EU
at the time of crisis management
After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, the European Union suggested one initiative
after another, which should have established a Euro-
pean perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first
suggestions of the EU were more under the influence
of Dayton, and less under the influence of Brussels.
Their characteristics were the slow entrance of the
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EU into the region, the absence of the strategic rela-
tions towards the countries of the Western Balkans,
the absence of the precise framework of approaching
Brussels. The first such initiative was launched by
France at the time of its presidency over the EU, De-
cember 1996, within the framework of the so-called
Royaumont Process. The suggestion was exclusively
related to the stabilisation of the South Eastern Eu-
rope, with the aim to support the Dayton Agreement
implementation. This was the first version of the re-
gional accession to the EU. The French suggestion
was added at the meeting of the Council of Ministers
of the European Union in Luxemburg, 29 April 1997.
Chief diplomats from the member states established
"a joint strategy" and accepted exclusively "regional
access" in deciding political? and economic criteria"
for the development of bilateral relations and signing
contracting relations with five states from the West-
ern Balkans. II The willingness to develop the institu-
tional relations was shown through the signing of the
Co-operation Agreement. The concept of
conditionality was mentioned then for the first time.
A year after the "regional access", the Council of the
European Union issued the Declaration" on special
relations with BiH in Luxemburg, 8 June 1998. Dec-
laration expressed the hope that BiH would follow
the path towards European integrations. Also, the
emphasis was placed on the readiness of the Union
and member states to help BiH on its way. At the same
meeting the Consultative Task Force of BiH and the
EU (BiH&EU - CTF) was established as a mecha-
nism of co-operation and consultation of the two sides.
It was envisaged that the meetings of CTF would be
held within the framework of working and monitor-
ing groups, as a lower form of co-operation, while the
plenary sessions were envisaged as the high level of
consultations. The first meetings was held in Brus-
sels on 10 May 1998.
At the end of the 1990s, the Western Balkans
was again the focus of ethnic clashes. The Milosevic
regime, problems in Kosovo and the potential dan-
ger in Macedonia additionally engaged Brussels. This
time it was the joint access of the EU member states
and the efficient use of the Western foreign and se-
curity policy. With the establishment of "the preven-
tion culture", new humanitarian catastrophe was not
allowed. By recognising the weaknesses of the post-
Dayton suggestions, the prestigeous Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies (CEPS) from Brussels, initi-
ated the forming of a Working Group at the end of
1998, which discussed "the future of South Eastern
Europe". This was the introduction into defining the
Stabilisation and Association Process, the strategy
direction that enabled the beginning of the integra-
tion of the Western Balkan countries into the EU.
The process marked the entrance of the strategy of
the EU into the region and the exit of the strategy of
the United States of America.
In addition to the promotion and practice of
"the prevention culture", during 1999 and 2000 the
region was flooded with new suggestions and initia-
tives from Brussels, such as Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Process, Stability Pact for South Eastern Eu-
rope, status of the "potential candidate", CARDS,
marketing preferences, offers for contractual rela-
tions and later pre-accession funds. Out of the seven
starting characteristics, three European "carrots"
have separated themselves and especially marked the
Stabilisation and Association Process: contractual
relations, trade preferential and financial help
through the CARDS programme. The first one regu-
lates the relations of the prosperous Europe and the
five countries of the Western Balkans, which are leav-
ing the phase of management crisis and entering the
institution-building phase. Besides the possibility of
making contractual relations, in the form of
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, in Septem-
ber 2000, the EU introduced trade preferential" for
the entire region due to its economic development.
A few months later it introduced the CARDS pro-
gramme, the financial instrument of support to the
entire process. Instead of development projects,
stabilisation projects were preferred. The contrac-
tual relations, trade preferential and CARDS assist-
ance are still the three most important characteris-
tics of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
New elements were successfully built upon this foun-
dation, additional financial help and mechanisms of
political co-operation. Europe has increasingly par-
ticipated in the reforms of the Western Balkan states.
In September 2004 already, the delegation of the
European Commission announced new financial help
for the next financial quarter, referring to the period
between 2007 and 2013.
All these initiatives resulted in the European
supervision of the reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The European Union offered its help in the majority
of transitional issues, integration of customs, taxa-
tion, legislation, and intelligence sector. It enabled
the creation of a single economic area, single taxa-
tion system, single banking space, institutional build-
ing at the level of BiH and so on. Only a few years
ago the reconstruction of BiH and the agricultural
reform in the area of privatisation, capital market
and finances were under the supervision of the USA
through USAID projects. Two entity and ten can-
tonal agencies for privatisation were formed, includ-
ing the special arrangements for the Brcko District.
For the sake of comparison the financial sup-
port from the EU donated over 2.5 billion Euro;"
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not counting the donations from the member states,
the government of the USA, donated a bit over 1
billion dollars since 1995.15 The most significant
assistance from the American Government was in
1997, at the time of the Dayton phase, when 217
million dollars were donated to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, most of which was allocated for re-
construction, which amounted to 154 million dol-
lars. Since then, the help from the USA decreased
gradually each year to come to some 50 million dol-
lars" in 2003. Whereas, on the other hand, the Eu-
ropean assistance increased. Between 2000 and 2003,
BiH was granted 391 million Euro from the EU.'?
This help does not include the support of the Euro-
pean Commission to the income balance ofBiH and
the bilateral donations from the member states. Cur-
rent USAID projects are in the shadow of the CARDS
programme, which is financed by Brussels. Besides
the last one, the new, more accessible funds are open-
ing: TWINNING and TAIEX, while even more com-
plex ones are being announced" ISPA and SAPARD.
Besides the monitoring of the work of the po-
lice structures, the EU has replaced the stabilisation
forces of NATO with EUFOR. Referring to event,
Xavier Solana stated: "All this is part of a journey
towards the only possible destination - the European
institutions."" Europeans learnt their lesson six years
ago from the Americans. On 2 December 2004, at
the inauguration of the EUFOR mission in BiH we
did not find out how long it will last. " He also said
in his speech, that the "mission continues until it will
be achieved."
The European perspective of
"Brussels" BiH
"The unification of Europe will not be com-
plete until the five countries from the Western Bal-
kan join the European Union."!" After introducing
the Stabilisation and Association Process in 1999,
conclusions of the European Council from Santa
Maria da Feira in mid 2000, the Zagreb Summit at
the end of 2000, confirmed the European perspec-
tive of Bosnia and Herzegovina was confirmed sev-
eral times, as was done in the following years, at the
meetings of the European Council at the end of2002,
in Copenhagen and in March 2003, and in Brussels.
This was the introduction into the Thessaloniki
Summit of the heads of state or government of the
EU member states, ten accessing states and five states
from the Western Balkans on 19 and 20 June 2003.
The European Council confirmed the decisiveness
of the Council of Ministers of EU at the meeting, to
fully and productively support the European perspec-
tive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and
Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. Also,
it was announced that these countries "will become
an integral part of the EU when they fulfil the estab-
lished criteria". Besides the declarative confirmation
of the European perspective, the suggestion to de-
velop the Stabilisation and Association Process was
accepted by introducing new instruments used in the
pre-association phase by the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The first novelty regarded the in-
troduction of the European partnership modelled on
the Accession Partnership" from 1997. Besides the
European partnership and additional instruments of
financial help, new ways for political co-operation
were opened. A political forum of the EU and the
Western Balkans was created. Regular annual meet-
ings were envisaged and exchange of opinion by
Ministers with different portfolios at the forum. Al-
ready in November 2003, the forum gathered Minis-
ters of Justice and Internal Affairs, from the mem-
ber states and five countries of the Western Balkans.
Following the Thessaloniki Summit, the Euro-
pean Union continued to send positive signals. Every
decision in Brussels additionally encouraged Bosnia
and Herzegovina and its attempts to join the EU one
day. Directorate General for the Enlargement of the
European Commission took over the responsibility for
the Western Balkans from the Directorate General for
Foreign Affairs. Instead of Benita Ferrero-Waldner,"
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, communication with
the official Sarajevo will be conducted by the Finish,
OBi Rehn, the new Commissar for Enlargement. In
contrast to the previous Commissar who was respon-
sible in the early phases of European integration, this
one prepares states for the full membership.
All European initiatives confirm the entrance
strategy of the European Union, with the determina-
tion towards the long-term political support and fi-
nancial help. They are not two-faced in their guar-
antee of the European perspective for the Western
Balkan countries, among which is Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is evident that this is a process of
the strategic character. The best example of this is
Croatia, which has passed all the phases of the
Stabilisation and Association Process, from a poten-
tial candidate to associate member for the candidate
for membership.
Future steps
Dayton is becoming the past of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Brussels more and more its future.
The first one ended the war and ensured peace, the
other opened up possibilities for its internal integra-
tion, regional co-operation and gradual inclusion into
the European current. Dayton symbolises political
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will and global strength of the United States of
America, and the weaknesses and absence of the EU
and its member states in the first half of 1992. The
Agreement showed that the USA is still the Euro-
pean power." At the time of the signing of the Agree-
ment, it was the "life belt" of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and it became the "straitjacket" a long time ago."
With its organisation, the existence of several inco-
herent legal systems, split market, management of
economic affairs was unable at the state level, and
the creation of an expensive, complicated and inef-
ficient apparatus were confirmed. The "Daytonian"
Bosnia and Herzegovina was created at the negoti-
ating table in a military base with the consent of the
two neighbouring countries. The exit from this phase
is understood by the distancing from Dayton and
approaching Brussels.
Brussels symbolises the return of the Western
Balkans" and its presence and influence in the region
that is growing stronger as well as the building and
strengthening of the BiH state and its central institu-
tions. The "Brussels BiH" enables the creation of a
single economic space, management of economic is-
sues at the state level, decrease of entity and cantonal
apparatus for the benefit of the state one, harmonisa-
tion and connection of the legal systems ofBiH with
the European legal heritage. Instead of assimilation,
which certain ethnic groups fear of integration is be-
ing offered. The "Brussels Bosnia and Herzegovina"
will not be constituted with the approval of its neigh-
bours, it will be created in years to come, and will be
the result of the political will and needs of its citizens,
business people, academia and civil society. As such,
it will last longer and will have greater value than the
one created in the American military base.
After almost ten years since the signing of the
peace agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is leav-
ing behind the time characterised by the stabilisation,
crisis management, Bonn authorities and American
hard diplomacy. From such a state it is entering a
phase dominated by institutional building and de-
crease of the OHR's authority despite the transitional
problems. If the first phase was characterised by the
strong engagement of the White House, frequent vis-
its by American political and military representatives:
Bob Gelbard and Wesley Clark, freedom of move-
ment, then the last period is characterised by the weak
interest of the USA for the reforms in BiH, its gradual
withdrawal from the region and the greater interest,
financial and political engagement of the European
Union, by the introduction of the added value tax,
joint customs, reform of the judiciary in BiH, etc.
After the implementation of the 18 directions
of the Road Map to the EU, and the recommendation
from the Feasibility Study in 16 priority fields, the
third round of duties, then the fourth, fifth and so on
will follow. The first two rounds marked the begin-
ning of the long-term process of harmonisation and
building of the state structure and its capacities in ac-
cordance with European standards. Out of all the laws
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH in
2004, more than half are in the function of approach-
ing ofBiH to Brussels. There are still many years, as
well as duties on the path to the end goal. In the best-
case scenario, the recommendation for the beginning
of the negotiations between BiH and the EU regard-
ing the signing of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement can be expected in the first half of 2005.
The recommendation from Brussels will come if the
implementation of more than 40 laws adopted in 2004
begins, if formation or reconstruction of 25 institu-
tions at the state level from the judiciary, security, in-
ternal market, intellectual property, competition, con-
sumer protection, metrology, veterinary, standardisa-
tion, food safety and other areas begins. Without the
full co-operation of the smaller BiH entity with the
Hague Tribunal, negotiations with the EU will be post-
poned for a more favourable time.
The signing of the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement marks the passage from the voluntary
into the phase of obligatory harmonisation of the BiH
Legal system with the judiciary of the EU. When the
Agreement is ratified and is in force, BiH will enter
the phase of the contractual relations with the ED. If
the High Representative decreases his responsibili-
ties prior to and during the negotiations, then during
the time of the implementation of the Agreement Bonn
authorities of the "international sovereignty." will not
be valid anymore. During 2002, the High Representa-
tive imposed 32 laws, a year later 14, and by the sec-
ond half of 2004, only three laws." If this trend is
reflected upon all other decisions by the High Repre-
sentative, which will fmally represent the exiting strat-
egy further development of BiH in the process of
stabilisation and association will be enabled.
The implementation period of the Agreement
is also the period for the possible change of the
Dayton Constitution and the creation of a functional
and rational BiH, which will enable efficient func-
tioning of all parts of the Dayton Peace Constitu-
tion. Considering the experiences of the countries
from the Central and Eastern Europe that became
full members of the EU in 2004, in each of the fol-
lowing phases of the relations with the EU, new in-
stitutions will be formed, new personnel will be edu-
cated, new state services will be built, that work in
the interest of its citizens. In 1997, BiH had three
State Ministries. Due to the European integrations
process, BiH now has nine State Ministries and over
30 other agencies at the state level.
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This process is irreversible. It can be faster or
slower, depending upon political will, available
funds, human resources and knowledge. The imple-
mentation of the agreement enables BiH to submit
the request for full membership. The negotiations
on the membership will be the most complex task
and the greatest challenge. Adoption and implemen-
tation of the complete European legal system, at the
end it will result in a number of some 50 State Min-
istries and some 100 agencies, offices and institutes,
which will serve the market, strengthen the export
capacities, supervise the market, environment pro-
tection, etc. The number of entity or cantonal au-
thorities will be highly reduced. All of these formal
steps are followed by significant reforms in the
economy, judiciary, internal affairs, defence, agri-
culture, customs, etc. In the end, BiH will transfer a
part of its sovereignty onto the European commu-
1 The special act of the European Union which is the first sup-
plement to the Rome Agreement. The act provides for the full
realisation of the joint market until 1992 and gives the Union
new authorities in the area offoreign political co-operation among
other things. It also provides the voting on the principle of quali-
fied majority in the area of joint market, strengthened role of the
European parliament, etc.
2 Holbrooke, Richard, Getting to Dayton, p. 381.
3 Interview with Haris Silajdzic, DANI, 27 August 2004, p. 14.
4 Dnevni avaz, 21September 2004
5 News Agency SENSE, 28 January 2004
6 Ibid.
7 The notion of aggression is suggested in the majority of the
resolutions of the UN Security Council, 757, 758, 760, 762 and
others from 1992. They ask for "the forces of Yugoslav People's
Army to withdraw from the BiH territory". Due to the violation of
this and other resolutions, sanctions have been imposed upon
the former Yugoslavia. In the sentences to Tadic and Krstic The
Hague Tribunal has also confirmed that this was an international
conflict which Serbia and Montenegro participated in.
8 Binyon, Michael, The Times, 20 May 1993.
9 Respect of democratic principles, human rights, rule of law
and minority protection.
10 Market economy, regional co-operation.
11 Albania, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro
(then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
12 Declaration on the special relations between the European
Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 Regulation of the Council 2007 - 2000 from 18 September
and amended by the Regulation of the Council 2563 - 2000
from 20 November, regarding almost all products, with a very
small number of exceptions, until 31 December 2005.
14 More information at: http://europa.eu.intlcomm/
external_relations/see/bosnie _ herzelindex.htm#5
15 More information at: http://www.usaid.ba/
16 Source: USAID BiH, for more information contact Kasey
Van nett
17 Report of the European Commission on the Stabilisation and
Association of BiH, for 2004, p. 16. More details available at the
Web pages of the EU, Delegation of the European Commission
in BiH and the Directorate for European Integrations of BiH.
18 From the Xavier Solana speech, inauguration of the EUFOR
mission, 2 December 2004.
19 Part from the suggestion of the European Commission for
the Council of Ministers of EU and the European Parliament
prior to the beginning of the Thessaloniki Summit.
nity due to the supremacy of the communitarian law
and its implementation in all EU member states. The
analysts of the ESI believe that it is not possible for
BiH to begin negotiations on the full membership
before 2007.26
In the process of European integration, most
likely not all ofBiH internal problems will be solved.
Perhaps it will not be organized in accordance to the
will of all its citizens, while the economy will not
even be close to the European average. However,
with the harmonisation of national laws and prac-
tice with the European provisions", directives", de-
cisions" and recommendations", market economy,
parliamentary democracy and rule of law will be es-
tablished according to the European Union model.
Political and economic space will integrate into one
whole, to the same extent as the unified Europe.
NOTES
20 The Accession Partnership joined the help of the European
Commission to the Central and Eastern Europe countries in one
document, as well as the priorities each state needs to fulfil on
its way towards the final accession to the EU. The accession
partnerships served as a support for other pre-accession instru-
ments including the joint assessment of the short-term and mid-
term priorities for economic policies, the pact on the organised
crime, national plans for development and other sector pro-
grammes necessary for the participation in the Structural funds
of the EU after the accession, for the application of ISPA and
SAPARD.
21 In the previous convocation of the European Commission,
Chris Patten was the commissar for foreign affairs.
22 Richard Holbrooke, Getting to Dayton, p. 373.
23 Wolfgang Petrich, Vecernji list, 28 January 2005.
24 In the EU terminology, the concept of the Western Balkan
means the area "west from Greece and south from Slovenia" or
the area of the former Yugoslavia without Slovenia and includ-
ing Albania, i.e. Croatia, BiH, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedo-
nia and Albania.
25 Source: Office of the High Representative for BiH
26 From the conference in Wilton Park, 10 June 2004.
27 The provisions are for direct implementation and in the en-
tirety obligation in the EU member states, without the need of
bringing the measures for the implementation at the national
level. They enable the Union institution the largest influence on
the legal system of the EU member states. They are considered
for the unification of laws throughout the Union.
28 The directives are not directly implemented in all member
states. They require brining the measures for the implementa-
tion at the national level till the deadline defined by a certain
directive. They do not oblige member states in their entirety,
only in the results they need to achieve. The directives leave a
certain level of freedom to authorised national bodies in decid-
ing in which way they will incorporate and implement the goals
of the Union within their legal system.
29 The decisions are entirely obligatory for those they are di-
rected at. They can be directed at one or all member states,
market subjects or individuals.
30 The recommendations are non-obligatory declarative instru-
ment. They are foreseen by the Establishing Contracts and used
by institutions, the communities for expressing the opinion to
member states and in some cases to individuals as well. They
do not impose any legal obligation to those they are directed at.
